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I NrRODUGr ION 
1. The purpose of this report is to present the Phase V activities of 
the Rotor Burst Protection Program (RBPp) as it moves towards its 
ultimate goal of making design data available to all turbomachine manu-
facturers so that they can provide rotor burst protection within tlight 
weight limitations. 
2. Phase V of the NASA-sponsored RBPP was conducted by the Naval Air 
Propulsion Test Center (AE), as contracted for in reterence a, during 
the period 1 August 1967 to 31 Julf 1968. 
3. The testing reported herein more close17 approximates realistic 
turbamachine operating conditions than did the previous 21 tests that 
were ooncerned primarily with basic fragment kinematics and tragment/ 
ring interactions (reference b). 
4. The high speed photographs present a good record ot the complex 
action ot both the rotor tragments and impacted containment devices. 
A qualitative an~sis ot these photographs provides insight into 
the etfects ot various parameters associated with the containment/ 
control phenomena. 
5. The cODDllents included in this report concerning certain test 
... c'bservations, and how they Dl81' arfect the design ot containment/ 
control systems, should be ot general use to the containment design 
engineer. 
6. The magnitude ot the ver'T real uncontained tailure problem associated 
with US cODDllercial airline operators and US Naval aviation is examined. 
Detsils concerning the 93 uncontained tailures in cOlllll8rcial experience 
and the 46 uncontained failures reported in Navy air experience, tor 
the respective investigator'T periods, are looked at in more dete.a in 
Appendix 1. 
7. Since the develo}B8nt ettort regarding contailD8nt/control &y8t_S 
is largely dependent upon the qualification specificatiOns that organi-
zations must meet, an UDder8taDding ot what 8C118 ot the8e turbomachine 
8pacifications have to 881' about contaiment i8 necessary to appreciate 
the overall contaillDent probl_. In Appendix 2, a majority ot the ap-
plicable 8pecifications are reviewed with regard to their contaillD8nt 
requirement8 tor equ1paent qualitication. 
8. Recaaaendations are made as to what avenue should be traveled by 
the RBPP to arrive at the JI08t beneticial technical level in the 
iDaediate tut-are. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
9. The RaPP has continued to generate unique data that is continu-
ing to be of benefit to those concerned specifically with the design 
of rotor burst fragment containment/control systems, and in general 
with the protection of personnel and equipment from failed turbine-
powered machinery. 
10. The uncontained failure problem still plagues the ccr, ,rcial and 
military air services.. FAA and NTSB records indicate that a minimum 
of 139 such incidences have occurred. Each one should serve as a 
warning that renewed efforts must be exerted by all safety conscious 
f.igencies to greatly minimize the catastrophic potential of an uncontained 
feilure. 
11. The rotor fragment control process is very complex and involves 
the interactions of lD8ll1' time dependent variables. The very rapid 
initial loading phase, with its generation of stress wave patterns and 
reflections, could influence the structural characteristics of the 
system before the gross deformation phase, (i.e., the plastic working 
of the Dlb.ooIerial(s» begins. Much work will be required before this 
phenaDenon is understood. 
12. A number of containment rings have failed in the weld area. prior 
to undergoing &nJ gross deformation. This indicates that particular 
attention must be given to the manufacturing process and the elimination 
of sensitive stress areas so as to enhance the max~ utilization cf 
the containMent material. 
13. The enerS7 absorbed by blf1de deformation during rotor burst 
fragment-contI'ol system interaction is significant and should be 
accounted for in aqy analysis for the design of f1ight-weigbt fragment 
control systems. 
14. The radial clearance between the rotor tip and inside diameter of 
the containment ring influences the fragment orientation at impact. 
The orientation,in turn, affects the detor.mation and kinetics of both 
the fragments and ~ontro1 device during the fragment control process. 
... 
15. The hardness ot the control device material has a significant 
effect on the t1P8 of detor.mation that the blades of a rotor fragment 
will sustain during their interaction with the control device. ID4i-
cations are that relativelY soft materials induce more rotor blade 
fragmentation than do re1ati~81y hard materials. 
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16. Rotor blades on r· .. agments were db.,.ily deformed by all types of 
contumnent dev-icea ur1t1(· ... the NAPre l A.~) test conditions. 'ihis indicates 
that the fragment passing through. the IJontainment ring, and attacldng 
other aircraft areas, will h~":T~ a sl-laller contact srea and consequently be 
capable of prodllCing a smaller h~lIj. riMs consideration is important 
in the desi~ of the overal.! aircr.l.i''':' protection system. 
17. The ~1;;..~le b1".d~ 3.mpacts experietlced during these contaimDent tests 
indicate that failed single blades cau cause larr ring excursions. If 
the rings (or portions of the cou'l:.aiment shield are restrained so as 
to prevent these excursions, stre3ses may be created that could cause 
shif:J.d fa.Uure. Once a fracture ~CCI.\'1"S and the integrity of the ring 
is destroyed, ntit o~ is tl"e release of fragments greatly increased, 
but the escape of hot gases ad":.~ teo 't.he dangers of engine fire • 
18. As a result of the single bJ.ad.e failure tests, it was observed that 
the blades remaining on the rotur' experienced ver,y little damage. 
19. The shorter, more rigid, steel starter blades experienced much less 
bending and buckling than did the "small" engine turbine blades when the 
starter fragments attacked the steel contaimDent ring. The blades of a 
titanium starter rotor fragment did not bend or buckle when they inter-
acted with a steel contaiDment ring. The titanium blades experienc<3d a 
grinding action that gradient17 reduced the blade lengths from the center 
of the fragment to its heel. 
REOOMMENDATIONS 
20. NASA should continue its active support of the Rotor Burst Pro-
tection Program's efforts directed toward the undertanding of the cCllplex 
phencaena associated with the control of fragments frCII failed, bigh-
speed, turbcaach1nes, and the generation of data to assist in the design 
of flight-weight fragment contaiDment/control S7st81D8. 
21. The materi~ evaluation portion of the RBPP should be inte-nsitied. 
This w111 serve not onl7 to investigate new designs and materials but 
also enlarge our material behavior experience that can be applied to 
the developunt of anaJ)'tical models. 
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22. The efforts to develop a computerized mathematical model capable 
of providing dynamic response data of containment/control 8.1stems under 
attack by various types of fragments generated by failed turbomachines 
should continue to receive NASA support. The model should handle ~ 
types of materials, designs, and constraints associated with various 
systems. 
23. Rotor fragment control design ~ses should def1n1tel1 consider 
the energy absorption potential and fragment orientation effects as-
sociated with the blades attached to a failed rotor fragment • 
24. Particular attention should be directed tQIard the ~ process 
of a fragment control system since this JDq' be as critical to the sys-
tem's performance as the material itself (welds are particularly criti-
cal). 
MmlOD OF TEST 
25. The test results presented in this report were obtained using 
basically the same equipnent and techniques described in references 
b and c. Basic~ the test procedure is as follows: 
The test rotor, modified to fail at a specified speed and produce 
certain shaped fragments, is connected to the air-driven drive turbine by an 
arbor. This assembly is positioned on the center cover assembly of 
the chamber's d.1shed head. The test containment ring is freel¥ sus-
pended from the underside of the center cover. ';: he axial centel" of 
the ring is in the plane of the rotor. Electrical connections are 
made from the photo-triggering strip, fixed to the inner diameter of 
the contaimnent ring, to the flash circuitI7. The photographic mirror 
(front surface) is accurately positioned at a 45-degree angle directly 
beneath the plane of action. The two photo-lights are positioned to 
provide the required illumination. The light from the flash units is 
reflected off the mirror to the rotor and ring. The high speed con-
tinuous_framing camara is positioned so that tLe optical axis of the 
camera I s taki ng lens forms an angle of 45 degrees with the plane of 
the mirror and the lens is adjusted to insure maximum object sharpness. 
A vacuum is drawn in the spin chamber to reduce the ae~c drag OD 
the rotor and thus the power required to accelerate the rotor to burst 
speed. The test cell is completely darkened and the camera cappiDc 
shutter is opened. The camera speed is brought to the desired fraiDI 
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rate ( it can maintain this con.tant framing rate for s.n extended period 
of time). Air pressure is applied to the drive turbine and it accelerates 
the rotor to bursting speed. When the rotor faUs, the fragments fly 
outward and contact the photo-trigaering strip as they bang into the 
containment ring. The contact of the fragments with the strip triggers 
the photo-lighting system, illuminating the interaction of the fragments 
and the ring. Pictures are taken o:f the subject image formed by the same 
mirror used to transmit the light. The duration of the lights is such 
that film rewrite on the continuous film strip does not occur. The cam-
era capping shutter is then closed and the film is removed for processing. 
26. The conditions for each test are listed in Table I of this report. 
DISCUSSION 
The Problem 
27. The complexities of today's and tcmorrow' s air travel operations 
are JD8IV' and v'a!"ied, and the problems affecting the well-being of the 
traveler must be recognized, receive top priority, and be solved by 
the various organizations that constitute the "air industry." 
28. One such problem is that of containing or controlling the fragments 
generated when a high speed turbomacbine (main engine, starter, auxiliary 
power units, environment control systems, etc.) fails. Unless controlled, 
these fragments may cut through fuel lines or control cables, penetrate 
fuel tanks, or depressurize the aircraft cabin. Any of these secondar,y 
effects may be more critical than the original loss of the turbomacbine 
powerp1ant • 
29. .l review of US cOJlDercial airline and US Naval aviation experience 
definitely indicates the presence of an uncontained failure problem. A 
m1n1Dn11l of 93 frapents have penetrated the casings of coamercial engines 
during the survey period (1962-l968). The NaV1 reports 46 uncontained 
"ngine failures from fiscal. year 1960 to fiscal. year 1967. 
30. These number. mq not be considered large by Salle, but the cata-
strophic potential of just one such failure should definitely place 
this problem high on the priority list of safety measures requiring 
increased attention. 
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31. A detailed presentation of the uncontained failure problem for 
both commercial airline operators and US Navy aviation is presented 
in Appendix 1. 
32. The "fixes'! that once satisfied certain uneontained failure prob-
lems cannot be applied to tod~'s much larger engines. Economics and 
safety demand lighter weight and more positive solutions. These 
solutions will be del~ed unless all members of the air industry 
actively contribute their talents to a general effort. Individual 
compaqr efforts under a cloak of propriety have only ver.y limited 
value since the air transport community cannot afford "safe" engines 
and "unsafe" engines. The dark shadow of an accident caused by an 
uncontained failure falls equally heavy on all airline operations. 
The Aircraft Design Review 
33. Design data produced by the RBPP is required not only by the turbo-
machine manufacturers but also by the airframe manufacturers. In Appendix 
2 to this report this requirement is discussed. Basically, the airframe 
manufacturel' must be able to evaluate the containment/control character-
istics of each turbamachine being considered for use iu his aircraft. 
The proposed system's soundness must. be examined, the weight penalties 
determined, and comparisons made against other methods of providing 
equivalent protection from bursting turbine-powered equipment for both 
passengers and aircraft. 
34. The safety design reviews conducted for each new aircraft can 
certainly utilize a greater quantity and quality of data concerning 
the uncontained failure phenomena. It is at this early stage of air-
craft development that answers should be obtained for this pro">lem. 
Early efforts will prevent the poor situation of having to provide 
contaimnent/control systems as afterthoughts that will be completely 
parasitic weight problems instead of possibly incorporating protective 
systems that could serve as structural members, noise and/or heat 
insulators, etc., as well as fragment controllers. 
General Test Objective~ 
35. The experiments presented in this report were conducted to studT 
the processes that are involved when high-energy fragments tram a 
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burst rotor interact with a simulated rotor casing or a fragment oontrol 
devioe - a device, usually cylindrical, that is designed to withstand 
the penetration and gross deformation failures induced by fragment im-
pact. More specifically, these experiments were condueted to: 
a. Study and measure the variables and faotors associated with 
rotor burst fragment control. 
b. Evaluate the effectiveness of light weight ballistio proteotion 
materials when used in rotor burst fragment control applioations. 
o. Determine what effect fragment and control device material 
properties have on the fragment control process. 
36 • General:q- speaking, the variables that affect fragment and control 
devioe reaction during the fragment control prooess are: 
a. The control devioe 
(1) material properties 
(2) shape 
(3) size 
(4) oonstraint 
b. The fragment 
(1) material properties 
(2) geometry 
(3) size 
(4) weight 
(5) velooity 
These basic variables combine to form what we term factors. The frag-
ment energy factor, for example, is a oombination of the fracment 
variables: shape, size, weight and velooit7. The frapent oontrol 
variables and factors are time dependent; that is, the7 change value 
with time during the control prooess: A cylindrioal oontrol devioe 
mq, under fragment attack, oontinuousq deform to an ellipse. The 
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material used m~ be strain rate sensitive; the fragment weight m~ 
diminish and as a result change in size and shape; and so on. Even 
these elementar.y observations indicate that the fragment control pro-
cess is complex and will involve the interaction and ccmbination of a 
myriad of ttme dependent variables. An awareness of these complexities 
has, to a large extent, influenced our experimental philosophy. Because 
we knew the phenomenon to be studied was complex, our approach was to 
dasign expertments that would isolate the effects of certain variables. 
This was done by parametrizing the variables and factors whose effects 
were to be studied, while holding the others constant from one experi-
ment to another. For example, in expertments 28 and 34 of this report 
the fragment control device material was the parameter (using steel 
and aluminum); other variables such as fragment mass, velocity, control 
device constraint and dimensions were held constant. Using this pro-
cedure, the effect of the various material properties on fraament 
deformation and behavior was studied. 
ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
37. The results and discussion of our experiments will be presented 
according to their primary experimental objectives. It should be 
understood, however, that the common objective of all the expertments 
conducted was to observe and measure fragment control variables and 
factors. 
Series I Investigation - Ring Material Hardness 
38. Experiments 25, 27, 28, 29 and 34 were conducted to study the 
deformations and kinetics experienced b,y rotor burst fragments when 
they interact with cylindrical fragment control devices made from 
metals of different hardness. 
a. Fragment G.erator: 
The fragments were three equal annular sectors from. a T58 
engine power turbine rotor. The general configuration and details 
regarding the fragment dimensions, weight, and material properties 
can be found in Table I, and a photograph of the turbine rotor modified 
to fail in the tri-hub mode is shown in Figure 1. 
b. Control Devices: 
The devices used for these experiments were continuous right 
circular cylinders made from. different metals. The details concerning 
the dimensions, weight, and material properties of the C7linders oan 
be found in Table I. The thickness of the control rings was determined 
b.v equating the kinetic energy of the fragaents at burst to the product 
of the control device material toughness and its dimensions. This 
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expression was then solved for the control device thickness. This type of 
design analysis is usually referred to as the "Strain Energy Method". 
c. ~sults - Test 25: 
The setup for test 25 is shown in Figure 2. The 4130 steel 
cylindrical control device (hardness 30 He) was only slightly deformed 
and experienced only sli~ht gouging along portions of the ringls inner 
surface (Figures 3 and 4). The rotor burst produced a tri-hub failure 
at 14750 rpm. As can be seen in Figure 5, the fragment deformation 
was limited to the blades; the disk fragments were not damaged. There 
is a blade deformation gradient that progressed from the "heel" of the 
sector (the initial impact point), where it is most severe, to the 
forward edge where the deformation was considered slight. The severely 
deformed blades curled onto themselves fram tip to root in a direction 
opposite that of rotor rotation. High speed photographs which capture 
the fragment-control device interactions are shown in Figure 6 • 
d. Results - Test 27: 
Figure 7 depicts the modified rotor and three-inch thick 
2024-T4 aluminum cylindrical control device mounted beneath the inner 
cover of Spin Chamber No.1 prior to test 27. 
High-speed photographs of test 27 are shown in Figure 8. The 
"fog" developed in the latter pictures is attributed to the generation 
of fine aluminum particles o Note also that the massive ring has ap-
parently not been moved or rotated fram its original position. 
The control ring suffered no gross deformation; however, severe 
gouging and same ballistic penetration were evident on its inner surface 
where the fragments impacted (refer to Figures 9 and 10)0 The rotor 
sector blades experienced a s~ilar gradient deformation as that men-
tioned in test 25. Unlike the extensive curling type of blade failures 
noted in test 25 against the hard steel ring, the blades of test rotor 
27 experienced much more fragmentation. Note the maqy small pieces of 
blades in the post-test photograph of the test 27 rotor (Figure 11). 
e. Results - Test 28: 
A ribbed aluminum cylindrical control device (Figure l2) was 
evaluated under attack by a tri-hub rotor burst at 22100 rpm. This 
6063 ribbed aluminum material is normaJ.~ used for lightweight deck 
and bulkhead ship structures. A typitJal cross section ot this struc-
ture is shown in Figure 13. High-spoed photographs of the :impact 
phenomena are shown in Figure 14. 
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The control device experienced both severe ballistic type 
penetrati2n and gross deformation (refer to Figure 15). A secondary 
shield of steel that surrounded the control device was struck by the 
fragments; was severely deformed; and fractured (refer to Figure 16). 
Although the containment ring did not substantially resist the movement 
of the fragments, it is interesting to note (Figure 14) the large amount 
of damage done to the blades before the fragments passed through the 
ring. 
l' • Results - Test 29: 
Test 29 was a tri-hub burst of a power turbine rotor into a 
4130 steel, rectangular cross section, cylindrical control device. By 
error, this test was made with the rotor turning in a direction opposite 
to that of normal rotation (blade installed upside down). 
High-speed photographs of test 29 are shown in Figure 17. Note 
that two of the three fragments are still contained within the contain-
ment ring after six milliseconds (last picture of Figure 17) while the 
third fragment has flipped out of the original plane of rotation. This 
nflippingn is one of the things a good containment device design will 
prevent. Effective containment is us~ associated with maintaining 
the fragments in contact with the device so as to maximize the inter-
action time. 
The control device experienced: minor gross deformation; 
same ballistic type penetration; and mild gouging (refer to Figures 
18 and 19). The blades of the rotor annular section were gradientl1' 
deformed; same characteristical.l7 curled back on themselves; others 
sheared at the root; and still others were torn fram the disk with 
the fir-tree fastener intact (Figure 20). The blade curling is simi-
lar to that experienced by the rotors of tests 25 and 27 even though 
one m&y' intuitively expect it to be more difficult to bend and curl 
a blade backwards as was the case with this test. 
g. Results - Test 34: 
The high-speed photographs of test 34, a tri-hub burst of a 
power turbine rotor into a flanged, cylindrical control device made 
fran heat-treated 4130 steel, are shown in Figure 21. 
The control device failed at its two weldments during fra,ment 
impact and was severel1' deformed, each halt being bent almost flat 
(Figure 22). The impacted surfaces were slightq scored. The blades 
of the annular rotor sectors were gradient17 deformed. Most of the 
blades had sheared at their roots atter curling onto themselves • 
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The results of test 34 serve to emphasize just how critical is 
the presence and quality of the ring weld. A number of rings have 
failed in the weld before the ring has had an opportunity to be plas-
tically deformed. The method with which containment/control devices 
are fabricated was shown to be critical to the performance of these 
devices and it is expected that the fabrication method will be a 
ver,y sensitive and important parameter for these systems. 
Series I - Ring Material Hardness Observations 
39. The hardness of the control device material has a. ~ignificant 
effect on the type of deformation that the blades of a rotor fragment 
will sustain during their interaction with the control device. Indi-
cations are that relatively soft materials induce more rotor blade 
fragmentation than do relatively hard materials. This observation 
is based on a comparative analysis of the results from simUar rotor 
burst experiments where 2024-T4 aluminum (test 27) and a relatively 
hard heat-treated 4130 steel (test 34) were used as fragment control 
device materials. One explanation for this could be as follows: The 
harder materials, being less penetrable than the soft, provide a 
relatively smooth surface along which the blades can slide or skid. 
As a result, a more uniform kinetic interaction occurs between the 
blades and the control device; thus the integrity of the blade is pre-
served even though it is grossly deformed. It is difficult at this 
t~e to predict which of the blade actions --the fragmented or 
integrally deformed --would be preferable for fragment control. 
Series I - Radial Clearance Observations 
. 
40. An examination of this series of tests also provides information 
concerning another important consideration regarding the design of 
containment/control systems, radial clearance. A study' of the high-
speed photographs indicates that the general action associated with 
a rotor sector fragment can be described as follows: 
a. When the fragment breaks awq frccn the hub section it moves 
along a tangential path through its center of mass and rotates about 
its center of mass with approximatelY the same angular velocity as 
the rotor at its burst speed. It is this cCDbined motion that causes 
the fragment to strike on its trailing edge (heel) while the leading 
edge, rotating awaY from the ring, does not strike the ring iDaediatelY. 
From this it is seen that the percentage of rotor outer edge area that 
makes initial contact with the inner surface of the ring, and the 
fragment's orientation relative to that surface, is dependent upon 
the type of rotor fragment, the burst speed, and the distance between 
the rotor and the ring, i.e., the radial clearance. 
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41. The aforementioned experiments indicate how radial clearance in-
fluences fragment orientation at impact. They also demonstrate how 
the orientation,in turn, affects the deformation and kinetics of both 
the fragments and control device during the fragment control process. 
The gradient deformation sustained by the fragment blades during their 
interactions with the different control devices is an example of the 
influence of orientation (or radial clearance - one depends on the other) 
on fragment deformation. This is an :important observation because it 
follows that preferential orientation of the fragment at impact can 
serve to promote more effective fragment control. 
Series I - Energy Absorbed bY Deforming Blades 
42. This series of tests also points out a fallacy with the majority 
of containment design procedures used tod~. No consideration is given 
to the energy absorption capacity of the blades on the rotor. The 
energy absorbed by blade deformation during rotor burst fragment / 
control device interaction is significant and should be accounted for 
in any analysis for the design of flight-weight fragment control de-
vices. Future RBFP efforts will study thif: phenomenum further. 
Series II - Critical Fragment Size 
43. Experiments 30 and 31 were the first of a series of experiments 
to determine what size rotor fragment has the most devastating effect 
on a cylindrical fragment control device. 
44. For this series of exper:iments several identical rotors were 
modified to fail at the same speed producing 2, 3 and 4 equal rotor 
sector fragments. These rotors were to be surrounded b.1 identicel 
cylindrical fragment control devices. OnlY the tri-hub bursts were 
performed to date. Test 31 was a repeat of the previous test since 
high-speed photographs were not obtained for test 30. 
a. Fr'pent Generator: 
The fragments were three equal sectors from an axial flow, 
air turbine starter rotor (refer to Figure 23). Details concerning 
their fragment weight, dimensions and material properties are contained 
in Table I. 
b. Control Device: 
The control devices were the flanged 1020 eteel a"liDdere 
shown in Figure 24. Details on the dblensions, weight and material 
properties of the control device can be fOUDd in Table I. 
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c. Results - Tests 30 and 31: 
High-speed photographs of exprlriment 31 are shown in Figure 
25. Tests 30 and 31 were tri-hub bursts of an air turbine starter 
rotor into a 1020 steel, flanged, cylindrical control device. The 
control devices experienced no noticeable gross defor.mation. The im-
pacted inner surfaces of the rings were severely gouged and suffered 
some shallow ballistic type penetration (refer to FigUres 26 and 27 
for test 30 and Figures 28 and 29 for test 31). Rotor sector de-
formation was limited to the blades which appeared to have buckled 
and bent (refer to Figures 26 and 28). 
Series III - Momentum Transform Fr'8'ent Control Device 
45. Experiment 26 was conducted to evaluate a design conc,ept for 
containing rotor burst fragments. This particular concept is not, 
suggested as a directly applicable design for a containment/control 
device, but it does emphasize the fact that protective systems should 
not be restricted to a cylindrical shape, as has been the case in 
almost all devices to date. It is the ccmbination of material and 
design that will eventually solve the fragment prote~tion problem, 
rather than just the use of a material or a design' without considera-
tion of the other factor. 
a. Fragment Generator: 
The fragments generated in this experiment were three equal 
annular sectors of titaniU"Jl (Ti 6Al4V), shown in Figure 30, frcm an 
air turbine starter rotor. Details concerning frapent dimensions, 
weight, and material properties mq be found in Table I. 
b. Control Devige: 
The control device was the 1020 steel lobed configuration 
shown in Figure 30. This device was termed a Jlcmentum transform 
fragment control device because it was designed to transform a 
considerable portion of the fragment's angular JIlOIIlentum into linear 
radial momentum of the control device. This would greatly reduce 
the torsional loading that generallT acccmpanies contailDent with 
cylindrical fragment control devices, especial ]7 those associated 
with aaller turbamacbines. 
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c. Results - Test 26: 
Test 26 was a tri-hub burst of an air turbine starter rotor 
into a three-lobed 1020 steel control device. High-speed photographs 
of the event are shown in Figure 31. Note that in picture 4 of Figure 
31 (three milliseconds atter impact) the once da18.1-shaped containment 
ring has becCDe circular. Deformation of the device was extensive. 
Two failures occurred at section weldments. The impact surface of 
the ring was slightly abraded. No ballistic penetration was apparent. 
The titanium blades of annular rotor sectors were ground during the 
impact process. Here again a gradient of deformation or "wear" was 
evident, being worse at the impact point and lessening toward front 
edge of the fragment (refer to Figure 32). 
Series IV - Large Rotor Tri-hub Burst 
46. Experiment 22 was conducted so that we could study' the interaction 
between fragments frCD a relatively large rotor and a a,rlindrical frag-
ment control device and also gain SCDe experience with the testing of 
moderately large rotors. 
a. Fragment Generator: 
The fragments were three equal annular sectors from the J65 
engine, 2nd stage turbine rotor. Refer to Table I for details con-
cerning the fragment dimensions, weight, and material properties. 
b. Control Davie,: 
The control device was a 4130 steel cylinder heat-treated to 
a strength of 220,000 psi. Details concerning the control device 
dimensions, weight and material properties can be found in Table I. 
c. Results - Test 22: 
Test 22 was an intentional tri-hub burst of a J65 engine 
second stage turbine rotor into a 4130 steel c1l1ndrical control 
device. Unfortunately, no high-speed photographs were obtained of 
this test. The control device was severely deformed aDd, freD the 
fracture surface apPearance, had fa1led in tension at three loaationa 
(refer to Figure 33). The impact surface had experienced light to 
moderate gouging; no ballistic t1P8 penetration of this surface was 
noted. 
The rotor blades on each armular seotor or frapent were 
sheared from the rotor and sev.rely deformed. In SCD8 cases the 
blade root section appeared to have been torn freD the rotor (refer 
to Figure 34). 
14 
I 
f 
I 
i 
! 
." 
L 
h 
~: 0" 
1 
.; \ 1 
L 
f.i 
I 
I· ~ 
\., 
NAPrC-AED-190l 
Series V - Blade Burst in a Fu11y-blacied Rotor 
47. Experiments 2.3, .32, and .3.3 vere conducted to study the behavior 
of a blade as it bursts fram a rotor, impacts a surrounding steel 
cylindrical casing, and interacts vith the blades remaining fixed to 
the rotor. 
a. Frwent Generator: 
The fragments for all three tests vere three blades fram a 
T58 engine power turbine rotor. These blades vere notched as shown 
in Figure .35 and placed in equall1 spaced l~cations on the rotor. 
Details concerning the fragment dimensions, veight, and material 
properties can be found in Table I. 
b. Control Device: 
The control device vas a continuous circular 1020 steel 
cylinder vhose thickness approximated the camposi te thicknf:'!1~ ot t~e 
layered power turblt,e casing of the T58 engine. Details ('r\:a.:c,!'~~1ng 
the size and mat.erl f 1 properties of the control device ~.;"e c~ntained 
in Table I. 
..•. 
. " . 
c. Results .::.? est ~:' 
High-sp.:, 3.~ phot.cg~aphs of experiment No. 2.3 are shown in 
Figure.36. The J.;"i;tl" t,urbine rotor three-blade burst into a mild 
steel cylindrical ~!ontrol device produced slight deformation of the 
control ring. h~·:.t'Ver, there was evidence of penetration and back 
bul'(ing of the e(w'irol device material at the areas of initial blade 
imriCt (reter to ~'igure .37). The ring did remain intact; there were 
no plug~ taU"·'.9S or circumferential. tailure surfaces. The released 
blades (.3) -underwf,'tlt severe de':ormation aDd tracture during the impact 
process (refer tfj Figure .38). A. tendency ot the blade tips to curl in 
a direction oP!N~:I.te that ot rotor rotation was noted. No blades other 
than thr.n;e modllitd to taU were released tram the rotor. The blades 
r_81n1%11 on tIl!; :~otor were onq mildly detormed at their tips. It 
should be noted, hat the contaiDment ring was treeq supported, i.e., 
no external at!'u: tures restricted the camparativeq large ring ex-
cursions ~h~~~ i:, Figure .36. 
d. !iaxperlri'Jnts.32 aDd .33 were cODducted to stud7 aDd evaluate 
the ettectiv'llf!s" ot HY140 steel in rotor blade burst control applica-
tions. HY140 .;':1.1 is produced by the United States S+ ... l Corporation. 
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e. Fryment Generator: 
Same as that specified for experiment 23. 
f. C9ntrol Device: 
The control devices were continuous, circular c,ylinders of 
HY140 steel (refer to Figure 39). In this photograph one of the four 
strain gages that are equal~ spaced on each containment ring evaluated 
at the NAPl'C(AE) can be seen. The white mass of epoxy and the plastic 
installation strip help prevent the strain gage leads fram being 
damaged during installation. 
g. Results - Tests 32 and 33: 
High-speed photographs of experiment 33 are shown in Figure 
40. No photographs were obtained of test 32. Both rings experienced 
similar damage; deformation of both the control devices was slight 
and only a limited amount of abrasion on the impacted surfaces was 
noted (refer to Figures 41 and 42). The failed blades were b~ 
deformed and had fragmented during impact. Those blades remaining 
on the rotors had only their tips deformed; they were bent perpendi-
cular~ backwards in a direction opposite to that of rotor rotation 
(Figure 43). 
Series V - Blade Burst Observations 
48. The single blade impacts experienced during these tests indicate 
that failed single blades can cause large ring excursions. If the 
rings (or portions of the containment shield) are restrained so as 
to prevent these excursions, stresses m~ be created that could cause 
shield failure. Once a fracture occurs and the integrity of the ring 
is destroyed, not o~ is the release of fragments greatly increased, 
but the escape of hot gases adds to the dangers of engine fire. For 
the particular rotor used in these tests the damage to the follow-up 
blades was slight.. Although the radial clearance for these tests 
was greater than for normal operating conditions, it is expected that 
this difference would not have substantial~ changed the results 
observed in these tests. 
49. Test 24 was a burst test of an air turbine starter rotor to 
evaluate a disk crack sensing device. This test was terminated 
premature~ by a drive spindle faUure. No conclusive results can 
be .w.ted other than the fact that the sensing s1stem triggered the 
photographic 878tem, as expected under the concii tiona imposed. 
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Induskial-Fe4eral. Coordination 
50. The RBPP encourages industrial and Federal organizatiol)s to parti-
cipate in the program. It is believed that the additional inputs from 
the various disciplines will enlarge our experience background, increase 
our technical awareness, and shorten the time required to provide satis-
factory design data. The interest in the RaPP is increasing and more 
organizations are contributing to the overall effectiveness of the 
program. 
The MIT Analytical ProP-am 
51. In June 1968 the NASA provided funds (Grant No. NGR 22-009-339) 
to the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Aeronautics 
and Astronautics, Aeroelastic and Structures Research Laboratory, to 
investigate the concepts, methods of an~sis, and evaluation thereof 
tor the containment/control of fragments from bursting turbomachines. 
The MIT goal is to generate the mathanatical model (s) described in 
reference b. Basica1.ly, this theoretical effort encompasses such areas 
as the development of methods of an~sis which ~ be used to predict 
the transient responses of fragments and control devices, including 
impact, penetration, and deflection response of the containment/con-
trol device. The NAPrC(AE) will continue to coordinate with the MIT 
personnel to provide experimental data required to establish various 
fragment-control system interactions and verify the computer model(s) 
to be developed. Although once this computerized mathanatical model 
is developed, it will not be the final answer to the uncontained 
failure problem. Computers are here to help the designer by' grinding 
out calculations and investigating various parametric relationships. 
The computer should amplify the effectiveness of the program by math-
ematically assisting in the selection of the most promising systems 
that will be translated into hardware and evaluated and thus avoiding 
the usual costly and time-con81DDi ng guideless cut-and-try testing. 
The use of the computer as an anal ytical tool will enlarge upon our 
abUity to explore new things, but is should be ramembered that the 
: computer is just a tool and the designer is the innovator. 
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TABLE I 
PHASE V TEsr DATA COMPTI.,ATION 
1. A detailed compilation of the twelve tests that were performed 
during Phase V of NASA DRP R-105 is presented in this table. This 
compilation is divided into four sections: 
a. Test objectives, photographic coverage, and burst speeds. 
b. Fragment generator details. 
c. Containment system details. 
d. Photographic system details. 
2. The following is a list of symbols used in this compilation: 
a. N = No or none 
b. Y = Yes or available 
c. C = Contained, i.e., no fragment perforated the containment 
device. 
d. Error = Actual speed minum design speed 
e. Percent Error = Error x 100 
Design 
f. Computational. error in rotor design calculation. 
g. Detailed photograph of containment device shown in main body 
ot report (Figure 13). 
h. Lamination of masking tape (1 inch wide) and aluminum tape 
(1/2 inch wide). 
18 
• 
I 
['-~ : j .S 
... 
, t~', (, 
~.~ 
t. 
[~ .' ~ 
I 
[ 
I; " ,1' 
. ,.:: 
" : . ....,; . 
. :, 
1. Ring cross section as per following sketch: 
-
-v1-- 5.0 + --........., 
..l. 
+ 
-.. 
-
j. Ring cross section as per following sketch: 
1-. 
5 
T 
19 
-
NAPI'C-AED-1901 
I 
, 
,-
.---
:---._-
N 
o 
, 
---
- I -
-, ~, ',' ,...I , ~:/ ,. ..• !'" ~ .. - r" ~ , 
.&.~..&. \.'IV"' 6 A& ....................... ..., ........ .-.::..-,;I ... ~~-•• 
Vl 
-s. 
~ 0 
..., Vl 
f ~ 
F-t 
'0 p.. 
.l • 1 & til ~ ..., ~ .. • .,... E-t = Test Objective 
(a) 
22 "Medium" Rotor Tri-hub Burst PYnamics N N 
Single Turbine Blade Dynamics within (b) 
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APPENDIX 1 
THE UNCONTAINED FAILURE PROBLEM 
1. ~h~re is definitely an uncontained failure problem associated with 
the main engine powerplants used by the US commercial airline operators 
and by the US Navy. This fact is borne out by the 139 uncontained 
failures reported by the Federal Aviation Agency (FAA), National Trans-
portation Safety Board (NTSB), and US Navy Aviation Safety Center during 
the period of NAPTC(AE)'s compilation. 
2. For every turbomach:!.ne in use on commercial air transports, military 
aircraft, ground support equipment, etc., an acceptable "system safety 
~'actor" must be detennined by someone. That "someone" varies throughout 
the industry and is dependent upon many established policies, both 
federal and civilian. 
3. An exact definition of a satisfactory system safety factor is diffi-
cult to state. The ideal factor would be equivalent to a perfectly safe 
condition (100% safe). Such a system would have absolutely no chance 
of failur . i.e., a pennissible failure rate, based on any failure 
criteria of 0.00. An interesting discussion on this point is presented 
in reference a where it is remarked that an absolutely safe aircraft 
would not fly; and an absolutely safe airw~s system would not pennit 
a single aircraft to take off, because of the measurable, even if re-
mote, probability that it might crash. 
4. The question now becomes: what is an acceptable system safety 
factor? Thi~ is, what is an acceptable casualty rate with respect 
to a desired perfonnance level. The RBPP has not discovered one, and 
the development of one is outsi.de the scope of this program. Some 
values are called out in various publications, but it is understood 
that they are based upon mathematical manipulation of data concerning 
electronic component production &ld a direct correlation between this 
type of data and the turbomachine problem is not apprec1~ted. 
5. Terminology plays an important part in any discussion of safety 
factors. In most instances people think and talk of f. system's 
"reliability" r~ther than using the word "safety". The permissible 
failure rate is rarely translated into fatality rates. It is our 
opinion that a safet.y criteria concerning the uncontained failure 
problem should not be misleading by its expression in terms of E.agine 
operating hours or possibly aircraft flights. It should be based 
on the potential loss of life that ca.l be caused by an uncontained 
failure. The RBPP's view of the turbine-powered equipment system 
safety picture can he understood with the assistance of Figure AI-I. 
A proper system safety factor can be obtained by increasing the 
AI-I 
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reliability of the hardware to a satisfactory level and/or providing 
protection again~t failures. 
6. Hardware reliability is basi~~a1ly dependent upon four subfactors: 
design, manufacture, use, i~d maintenance. 
7. Engineers have advanced in design techniques and their growing 
backlog of operational experience increasns their ability to provide 
high performance equipment within more definite aafdty limits. No 
one designs a part to fail in the operati~nal range of the equipment. 
8. Manufacturers state that they use the highest quality materials, 
the latest processes, and many of ths most recently developed inspection 
techniques to provide a high quality item. 
9. Equipment operators are b3tter trained all along the line fram the 
pilot to the test bench operator. Increased experience has led to the 
establishment of more realistic operating limitations. 
10. Equipment maintenance has been improved by the awareness, during 
the initial equipment design phase, of certain maintenance requirements 
and thus provisions are made for necessary servicing and inspection. 
11. Modern equipment is used by larger work forces in better facilities 
to keep the equipment working proper~y. 
1.2. From the general efforts listed above, it is reason'lble to believe 
that a general improvement in the safety pictUl'e should be observed. 
This is the case when c,n.e reviews the experience of US commercial 
airline operators with main turbine-powered, propulsive powerplants. 
Figure Al-2 indicates n steady increase in the use of gas turbine 
engine operating hours 0 Along with this increase, there is a 
decrease in the number of powerplant shutdowns (for any reason) per 
engine operating hour. This favorable sF£ety trend is indicative of 
improved hardware reliability and failure-sensing instrumentation 
(reducing the llumber of false shutdowns). 
13. Unfortunately, this favorable safety trend is not seen when looking 
at the number of uncontained failures experienced by the US cammercial 
airline operators. A minimum total of 93 occurrences of fragments fram 
failed engines penetrating the engine casing has been r,Jtporte~--22 of 
these occurring as recently as 1967. Nota that the 1968 recori is not 
complete since the NTSB data has not been reviewed and irlcorporated 
into this yearly total. The total is considered a "min~um", since 
for various reasons, cartain airlines were not required to participate 
Al-2 
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in the MRR Program from time-to-time, and therefore, their failure 
experience is not made available although their usage rate is. 
14. This total of 93 failures is not just the product of one particular 
engine secticn. A breakdown of the uncontained failures by compressor 
and turbine sections is shown on Figure L.-4. Evidently, the problem 
is not isolated to one section or type of fragment. 
15. For those who consider system reliability factors in terms of 
component or failure rates, Figure Al-5 presents the number of un-
contained failures per million engine operating hours. The 1.27 
uncontained failures per million engine operating hours in 1967 is 
equivalent to 1.75 uncontained failures per month, which should be 
alarming considering the potential danger associated with such a 
failure. 
16. From these data it is apparent that hardware reliability alone is 
not adequate to provide the type of "system safety" required by turbine-
powered engines. Therefore, to increase this factor, additional pro-
tection must be provided for this system. As indicated in Figure Al-l, 
this protection could possibly be provided by two means. The first is 
to sense the impending rotor failure and rapidly shut down the engine 
before failure occurs. This does not seem to be practical at this 
time considering the rapidity of such a failure and the inadequate 
instrumentation systems capable of the proper sensing and rapid re-
sponse necessary to obtain the action required. The second approach 
to increasing the "system safety factor" is to provide special protection 
that will either contain t.he fragments completely in :. predetermined 
envelope or control the trajectory of the fragment away from sensitive 
areas, such as fuel lines and cabins, into less sensitive areas. It 
is this approach that the RBPP is following. The protection systems 
considered here should be structurally functional and impose the 
minimum weight penalty on the overall system. 
17. Figures Al-6, Al-7, Al-8, and Al-9 present the Navy picture, which 
is similar to that of the US commercial airline operation. The type 
of operation and maintenance procedures available under certain 
operating conditions has to be considered when comparing cammercial 
with militar.y data. An item of pr~e importance of Navy data is the 
large number of uncontained failures during the fiscal years 1966, 
1967, and apparently carrying on into fiscal year 1968. 
Al-3 
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18. Although the previous discussion has dealt exclusively with the 
turbine-powered engines, used in the aircraft's main propulsive system, 
it should be noted that the uncontained failure problem is not isolated 
to this category of turbomachinery. Detailed data has not been compiled 
concerning the number of uncontained failures associated with "smaller" 
turbine-powered equipment, but a number of such incidents have come to 
the attention of the RBPP. 
19. With the increased size of the newer aircraft, the requirement 
for larger and more powerful auxiliary systems to provide more engine 
starting power, higher hydraulic pressures, and grea'ter conditioned-air 
flaw also increases. Even though considered small in size compared to 
the main powerplant, these units can not be considered less dangerous 
with respect to an uncontrolled failure when one realizes the extremely 
high operating speeds and the critical locations in which these units 
are sometimes pl?Jed. 
20. Another point to consider concerning turbine-powered starters, 
auxiliary power units, and environmental control systems is that they 
are not only used for airborne applications. Many units are operated 
in crowded air terminal boarding areas, on aircraft carrier decks 
surrounded by aircraft, weapoLs, and personnel and at tactical ~ 
power-generator and/or communication ce~ters. 
REFERENCE 
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APPENDIX 2 
THE AIRCRAFT DESIGN REVIEW 
1. The objective of this appendix is to emphasize the definite need 
that can be partially satisfied by the application of the results of 
the RBFP. Information about the types of fragments that exit the 
casings of failed turbomachines, the energy level of these fragments 
and some knowledge about the associated containment/control phenomena 
is essential to those concerned with insuring adequate vehicle and 
passenger protection against rotor bursts. 
2. As a result of the initial design phase of an air transport vehicle, 
the powerplants and other major components are positioned to provide 
optimum aircraft operational characteristics. Following this, a safety 
design review is conducted. Its objective is to discover and correct 
all hazardous conditions. A hazpxdous condition is one that could 
result in a loss of life. A portioll of this design review procedure 
is the analyses of the damage potential, to both vehicle and passengers, 
in the event of an uncontained failure or a turbine-powered component 
such as an engine, starter:, auxiliary power unit, or environmental 
control system unit. All possible failure paths are investigated and 
the damage associated with each one is estimated. If a potential 
failure can inflict critical damage, the fragments must either be 
contained, controlled, or the turbomachine must be relocated so that 
the uncontained fragments will not damage a sensitive area. Before 
the engineer can make such determinations, he must have many facts 
based upon reliable data. 
3. During the RBPP's investigations, it became apparent that decisions 
were apparently being made based on assumptions or statements not sup-
ported by sound engineering facts. This lack of good data could be 
quite critical to the final aircraft design. An example of the type 
:Jf problem that can be precipitated by an "unsound It value is illustrated 
by this hypothetical situation. As a result of the aircraft's preliminary 
design, an engine was positioned such that an extension of the plane of 
rotation of the large fan rotor cut across a stabilizer section. Damage 
to this section could critically affect the aircraft's controllability 
and therefore is not permitted. Obviously, all fan fragments must be 
contained or controlled so as to be incapable of striking the panel, 
or the engine relocated so as to have all passengers and crew seats " . 
and other sensitive areas outside the fan's plane of rotation. 
12-1 
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4. Which of these three alternatives (contain, control, or relocate) 
to select is the problem. Various criteria are established to evaluate 
the alternatives, but for the purpose of this brief discussion let it be 
assumed that aircraft weight is the prime consideration. The weight 
penalty incurred by relocating the engine is probably the most ac-
curately determined value, since all input values are accurately known 
to the aircraft designer. '£he most questionable value to be considered 
is the estimated weig:lt penalty to provide containment or control of 
the engine fragments. This is questionable for a number of reasons. 
Mainly, the newly designed engine is usually much different (size, 
blade shape, etc.), than ~ other engine with extensive operating 
experience. Therefore, an extrapolation of either the same protective 
system design used on previous engines, or the design data and procedures 
used in establishing th~s previous system, ~le very little basis. Ex-
trapolation of all impact data is q~estionable because of the sensitivity 
of such data to the type of impactor (projectile) and target conditions. 
In addition, the weight of this previous containment device, assuming it 
truly does contain all fragments it was designed to contain, may not 
necessarily be of minimum weight. Usually containment ring development 
dealt with material evaluations only and very seldom were they the 
combinatiou of system design and material investigations. Previous 
protection systems considered only the complete containment of fragme~ts 
and no thought was given to the possible schemes to control the trajectory 
of the fragments away from the sensitive areas rather than to completely 
capture the fragments. So this potential has no real data to offer for 
the decision~aking process. The engineer could be faced with making a 
decision based on a protective system weigl.t that may be 100% in excess 
of what is actually necessary. Since sound decisions are based on 
sound facts, it is obvious that today's aircraft designers do definitely 
have a requirement for the type of information being produced by the 
RBPP-. 
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RorOR INTEGRITY SUBSTANTIATION AND CONrAINMENT CRITERIA 
A. GENERAL 
1. All turbjne-powered equipment is designed in compliance with 
a specification that establishes the requirements for minimum perform-
ance and quali.ty control standards. In this part of the report we will 
discuss those sections of certain turbamachine specifications dealing 
with rotor integrity substantiation and containment criteria. These 
sections are, of course, of greatest interest to the Rotor Burst Protection 
Program. During our investigations a number of specifications have been 
reviewed. These specifications were discussed with authors and users. 
2. The purpose of our discussion is to provide the reader with 
sufficient information so that he may generate a feeling for the type 
of r~quirements that in m~ cases determine the level of effort 
devoted to rotor fragment control. 
3. The comments made in this section of the report concerning these 
specifications are those of the authors, based on the specifications 
herein listed, and should not be interpreted as official statements 
of the policies of ~ agency. There m~ be other regulations that 
apply to this discussion but tUne limitations did not allow for a more 
exacting examination than that made. 
4. The basic document for U. S. commercial aircraft operations is 
the Code of Federal Regulations. Of major interest to the RBPP is the 
book that contains the rules and regulations which constitute Parts 1 
to 59 of Title 14, Aeronautics and Space, revised as of 1 January 1967. 
It is one of three volumes that replaced the 1966 revision and became 
an integral part of the Code of Federal Regulations. 
5. In addition to the Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR), the 
Department of Transportation, FAA, publishes Advisory Circulars that 
provide guidance and acceptable means, although not sole means, by 
which compliance m~ be shown with the requirements of certain portions 
of the FAR. The FAA also publishes other documents that contain min-
imum performance standards and specifications for materials, parts, 
and appliances used tn the aircraft. A Technical Standard Order (TSO) 
is an example of this type. 
6. For turbine-powered equipnent to be qualified for use in the 
military service, it must meet militar,y specifications that cover the 
standard requirements set forth by the using service. 
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7. Part 25 of reference (a) presents the Airworthiness Standards 
for Transport Category Airplanes. Subpart E - Powerplants, General, 
considers the general regu.lations for pOHerplant installations, 
engines, and propellers. 
a. Paragraph 25.901, Installation states: 
"(1) For the purpose of this part, the airplane powerplant 
installation includes each component that: 
(a) Is necessary for propulsion; 
(b) Affects the control of the major propulsive units; 
or 
(c) Affects the safety of the major propulsive units 
bet"Teen normal inspections or overhauls. 
( 2) F or each pO"Terplant: 
(a) The engine installation must meet the applicable 
provisions of this subpart; 
(b) The components of the jnstallation must be 
constructed, arr'~ged, and installed so as to ensure their continued 
safe operation b:;.tween normal inspections or t1verhauls; 
(c) The installation must be accessible for necessary 
inspections and maintenance; (·~.nd 
(d) The majr,;:' components of the installation must be 
elect:-ically bonded to the other parts of the a~.rplane." 
b. Portions of paragraph 25.903 discuss engine type certifica-
tion, isolation, SIld turbine engine installation. 
"(1) EngIne type certification. Each engine must be type 
certificated under Part 33 (New). 
(2) Engine isolation. The pmrerplantr) must be arranged 
and isolated from each other to allow operation, in at least one 
configuration, so that tha failure or malfunction of any engine, or 
of any system that can affect the engine, will not: 
(a) Prevent the continued safe operation of the 
remaining engines; or 
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(b) Require immediate action by any crewmember for 
continued safe operation. 
(3) Turbine engine installations. lTnless the engine type 
certificate specified that the engine rotor cases can contain damage 
resulting fram rotor blade failure, turbine engine powerplant inst~la­
tions must have a protection m~ans so that rotor blade failure in any 
engine will not affect the operation of remaining engines or jeopardize 
continued safety. In addition, design precautions must be taken to 
minimize the probability of jeopardizing safety if an engine turbine 
rotor fails, unless: 
(a) The engine type certificate specified that the 
turbine rotors can withstand damage-inducing factors (such as those 
that might result from abnormal rotor speed, temperature, or vibration); 
and 
(b) The powerplant systems associated with engine 
control devices, systems, and instrumentation give reasonable assur-
ance that those engine operating limitations that adversely affect 
turbine rotor structural integrity will not be exceeded in service. " 
c. Paragraph 25.905 pertains to propellers: 
"(1) Each propeller must be type certificated under Part 
35 (New). 
(2) Engine power and propeller shaft rotational speed 
:flay not exceed the limits for which the propeller is certificated." 
8. Similar regulations are called out in Subpart E - Povlerplants, 
of Part 23 - Airworthiness Standards: Normal , Utility, and ~crobatic 
Catego~ Airplanes • 
9. Part 33 - Airworthiness Standards, Aircraft Engines (reference 
(a)) is of special interest to the RBPP. This part describes airworthi-
ness requirements for issuing type certificates, supplemental type 
certificates, and changes to those certificates, for aircraft engines. 
Each applicant must ShOll that the aircraft engine concerned meets the 
applicable requirements of this part. 
a. Paragraph 33.13 stated that: "the engine mq not have de-
sign features that experience has shown to be hazardous or unreliable. 
The suitability of each questionable design detail or part must be 
established by test." 
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10. FAA Advisory Circular No. 33-2, Aircraft Engines Type Certifi-
cation Handbook, dated 30 March 1966, reference (1), c('.D.tains guidance 
relating to type certification of aircraft engines. 
11. "Official engine certification tests are conducted in accordance 
with the authorization directed to the applicant. The tests required for 
engine certification are as prescribed by pertinent sections of FAR, 
Part 33." 
12. '~itnessing of tests by FAA representatives as prescribed in 
FAR, Section 21.33, is accomplished at least for the engine calibration, 
endurance, and operation tests, and the teardown inspection following 
these tests. Federal Aviation Agency representatives m~ also witness 
such specialized tests as vibration measurement, detonation, rotor 
integrity, rotor blade containment, icing and ingestion tests. The 
engine manufacturer's designated engineering representative should 
witness all certification testing and subsequent parts improvement 
tests, conducted by the manufacturer, for the purpose of authenticating 
the tests and the results." 
13. Since all containment testing must be authenticated, it would 
contribute to the general knowledge of the RBPP if the results of these 
tests, both the successful and unsuccessful occurrences, are made avail-
able to the RBPP. 
B. RorOR INTEGRITY SUBSTANTIATION 
14. Now w~ will direct our attention to those sections of the 
Federal Aviation Regulations and military specifications that are con-
cerned with rotor integrity SUbstantiation. 
a. Engines 
(1) Paragraph 33.27 of reference (a) relates to the 
substantiation of engine rotor integrity. The regulation states: 
"(a) To minimize the probability of failure of 
rotors: 
1 Rotors must be demonstrated to be of enough 
strength to withstand damage inducing factors such as those that might 
result from abnormal rotor speeds, temperatures, or vibration and other 
stress inducing factors, and 
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g The design and functioning of engine control 
devices, systems, and instrumentation must give reasonable assurance 
that affect rotor structural integrity ,·Jill not be exceeded in service." 
15. Advisory Circular 33-3 (reference (b)) (Hhich cancelled AC 
20-26) sets forth guidance and acceptable means, not the sole means, 
by \..,hich compliance may be shown with the turbine and compressor rotor 
substantiation requirements in Federal Aviation Regulations, Part 3~'. 
16. "To provide reliability and safety of turbine and compressor 
rotors of turbine engines, turbo superchargers , and power recovery 
turbines used \-lith reciprocating type engines, their design and con-
struction must provide structural integrity of sufficient strength 
to withstand specified overspeeds and overtemperatures \·dthout failure 
~ess rotor bursts are demonstrated to be contained within their 
respective housings. To cope with the possibility of critical deterior-
ation of rotor assemblies from service use, inspection and life limit 
criteria are established and are set forth in the engine instruction 
manual. The substantiation procedures stated in this Advisory Circular 
are those uhich have been used and found to be acceptable." 
17. Paragraph 6a of reference (b) requires that the "engine manu-
facturer should design turbine and compressor rotors to have sufficient 
strength margin to alloH safe operation with likely variations in 
materials and operating environment. The effects of damage-inducing 
factors, which may effectively reduce the strength of rotor discs, 
should be minimized by design features, taking into account the reduction 
of strength that may be caused by surfac€! damage and corrosion, occasional 
overheating, material fla\.;s or other substandard metallurgical properties 
difficult to detect, likely dimer.sional and quality variations, vibration, 
an~ fatigue. Vibratory stresses shC'"..t.1.d be determin~d 'md allowable 
stress limits establishod. Consideration should be given to the loads 
and str(.sses, o:::casinned from airpl"'G:J inlet distortion, bleed air, and 
exr.aust syston: effects! start-stop cyclic stresses (low-cycle fatigue), 
and vibratory stresses (:agh-cycle fatigue) .. tI 
18. Test techniques to demonstrate the over strength margin of 
ro~,ors are listed in paragraph 6(d) of reference (b): 
a. uRepresentat~.ve design turb:1.f.Le and compressor rotors 
should be subjected to operation for a sta.bilized period of at least 
five minutes' durati..on, at the maximum rat,i2'd temperature conditions 
and accompanied by an overspeed r.p.m. as determined in the following 
paragraphs. In demonstrating adequate overstrength margins, evaluation 
o,~' the effects of actual oV9rload 8treS('l.~S at the specified maximum 
:'f3St conditions is desired. Knowledg~ c:f the et.resses in all rotor 
components is needed, but the most critic.ally stressed discs and the 
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most critical stresses in these discs are of paramount interest. For 
multistage compressors and turbines, demonstration of only the most 
critical stages is acceptable. The condition of critical rotor com-
ponents following this demonstration should be such that there is no 
evidence of incipient failure or critical distortions which could 
cause hazards to an aircraft. A five~inute stabilized test period 
is acceptable for the purpose of this test, which is mad~ to evaluate 
short-term creep and el')ngation that could lead to rupture. 
(1) Testing at Overspeed Stresses. Over strength margins 
relative to overspeeds m~ be demonstrated by ~ of the following test 
techniques: 
(a) Rig testing a rotor disc, equipped with dummy 
blade weights, at max~um overspeed while heated to its usual maximum 
operating temperature conditions • 
(b) Testing rotor assemblies in a complete engine 
to maximum overspeed while developing the maximum permiSSible gas 
temperature for the highest rated speed. 
(c) Testing a rotor in a complete engine, but with 
the disc(s) having appropriately thinned sections at critical areas to 
produce maximum rated gas temperatures and maximum operating r.p.m. 
(d) Turbosupercharger units tested as complete 
units and driven by a hot gas supply from a special burner rig. 
(e) Testing rotors or units separately (complete 
with blades or dummy weights) by cold spinning, plus acceptable cal-
culated data to ascertain the effects of temperature on critical 
stresses. For this method to be successful, accurate and extensive 
data are r~quired including disc temperature survey data from operating 
engines and data on hot strength properties of the disc material. 
(2) Determination of overspeed r.p.m. for test. The 
overspeed r.p.m. of all turbine engines, turbo superchargers and power 
recovery turbines to which rotor discs are to be tested should be 
established through failure analyses criteria in determining the ef-
fects of reasonably probable and likely remote failures causing engine 
overspeeds. The failure of structural elements of the engine and its 
installation need not be considered if the probability of such failure 
is considered to be extremely ~emote. The highest r.p.m. of the 
follOWing should be established as the overspeed r.p.m. 
A3-7 
, 
, 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
f 
t 
i 1 
I 
, 
i f ! . 
~ ~ 
f 
, j 
, 
I [ . 
I 
. I 
.1 I 
., 
NAPl'C-AED-190l 
(a) One hundred and fifteen percent of the maxfmum 
rated r.p.m. if the demonstration is made on a complete engine incor-
porating standard compressor and turbine assemblies. 
(b) One hundred and twenty percent of the maxfmum 
rated r.p.m. if the demonstration is made under simulated conditione 
acceptable to the Administrator, such as in rotor component test rigs. 
(c) An r.p.m. equal to 105 percent of the highest 
speed that would result from failure of the most critical component 
or system in a representative installation of the engine 
(d) An r.p.m. equal to the highest speed, which 
would result from the combination of two failures of com~vllents and/ 
or systems in a representative installation of the engine. For each 
combination considered, one of the failures causing overspeeding should 
include a component or system whose failure would not normally be 
detected during a routine preflight check nor during normal flight 
operations. 
(3) Testing at Overtemperatures. Turbine engine rotor 
assemblies should be operated at leadt five minutes at the maxfmum 
rated r.p.m., with the measured turbine gas temperature (as normally 
measured in tt9 engine) at least 75°F in excess of the highest maximum 
permissible rated temperature value. This test should be accomplished 
by operating sufficiently long to heat-soak the turbine elements. The 
strength margin is sufficient only wh0n the condition of the turbine 
assembly following this test is satisfactory and still within serviceable 
lfmits. The purpose of this test is to insure that excess strength is 
provided to preclude rapid deterioration or failure of turbin~ rotors 
in the event of 75°F overtemperatures, which m~ result from sudden 
control or other system failures in a tfme interval in which a flight 
crew can be expected to be alerted anr. take corrective action." 
19. The general military specification for turbojet and turbofan 
aircraft engines, HIL-E-5007C (reference (c», spells out the rotor 
over strength margin requirements for military aircraft engines. Para-
graph 3.16.32 of reference (c) states: 
. 
a. "To provide necessary margin for rot'or structural integrity, 
the compressor, fan and turbine rotor(s) shall be of sufficient strength 
to withstand the following abnormal conditions: 
(1) Rotor speed(s) of 115 percent of maximum allowable 
speed and at maximUIl'. allowable measured gas temperatures as specified 
in the model specification for 5 minutes, 
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(2) Measured gas temperature at least 75°F (14.7°C) in 
excess of the maximum allowable measured gas temperature and at maximum 
allowable speed as specified in the model specification for 5 minutes. 
Substantiation of conformance with this requirement shall be submitted 
to the using service prior to initiation of the l50-hour endurance test." 
20. The model specification mentioned above refers to the specifica-
tion that applies to one particular engine only, whereas the general 
specification applies to all engines of a general type. That is, the 
J65 and J71 turbojet engines each have a different model specification 
but each have to comply with the requirements of MIL-E-S007C, the 
general military specification for turbojet aircraft engines. 
21. Paragraph 3.16.3.1 of reference (c) calls out the action re-
quired by the engine manufacturer to avoid the possibility of a cata-
strophic failure. '~he contractor shall conduct a study of all possible 
failure modes of all high rotational speed portions of the engine with 
the objective of eliminating the possibility of catastrophic failure 
where failed parts penetrate the engine cases. Fail-safe designs shall 
be incorporated with the objective of eliminating the possibility of 
catastrophic failure. Particular attention shall be given to the fol-
lowing: 
a. The integrity of turbine and compressor discs with the 
objective of having blades fail first under overspeed or overtemperature 
malfunctions. 
b. The integrity of shafts connecting compressors to turbines 
such that bearing or lubrication failure shall not cause parting or 
decoupling of the shaft. 
The results of the study sod the fail-safe designs shall 
be submitted to the usin~ service prior to initiation of the Preliminary 
Flight Rating Test (PFRl'}." 
22. Manufacturers comply with the aforementioned rotor structural 
integrity specifications by analytically showing sufficient safety 
factors and speed and overtemperature control systems. Main powerplant 
engine rotors are never designed to intentionally fail in the rotor rim 
section at some slight overspeed condition. A "rim failure" would 
release a small section from the outer edge of the disk. This disk 
segment would probably have a few blades attached to it. The proposed 
advantage of a rim failure over a hub failure is that les~ massive 
fragments (rather than disc chunks) are released and the loss of the 
blades will retard the rotor speed. Intentional rim failures will be 
discussed later in the "Starter" section of this appendix. 
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b ~ Auxiliary Power Units 
(1) Gas turbine auxiliary pOwer units 3Te intended to be 
used as po'-Ier sources for driving generators, hydraulic pumps, and other 
accessories and equipment, and to proviue compressed air for pneumatic 
systems. APUts are found in a variety of locations both airborne and 
on the ground. The advent of the larger aircraft has made it necessary 
to utilize a number of units throughout rather than the customary single 
unit servicing the entire aircraft. 
23. The FAA Technical Standard Order TSO-C77 "Gas Turbine Auxiliary 
Power Unit", reference (d), contains minimum performance requirements 
for gas turbine auxiliary power units for use in civil aircraft. Para-
graphs7.2.l and 7.2.1.1 specify the overspeed and overtemperature 
capabilities of rotor assemblies that must be substantiated for t~e 
critical stages. A determination of what is a critical stage is usually 
more of a problec when discussing containment criteria than when dis-
cussing rotor integrity. Additional comments will be made concerning 
the determination of a critical stage when containment specifications 
are reviewed. 
24. Paragraph 7.2.1 requires that: "the overstress margin for com-
pressor and t,~bine rotors shall be substantiated to be adequate to 
withstand operation for five minutes at the critical rotational speed 
which is the highest of the speeds specified by subparagraphs a, b, 
and c below while at the turbine inlet or exhaust gas temperature 
which would p::'Qvail during a!:tual operation under the fault conditions 
~If b or c. 
a. A speed equal to 115% of the maximum rated speed. 
b. If safety devices are incorporated a speed equal to 115% 
of the lLighest speed which would result from failure of any one of the 
normal engine control 3ystems. 
c. If no safety dev:i r.:es are incorporated a speed equal to 
the highest speed which would result, from the failure of any one of 
the normal engine control s,ystems. 
25. The overstress margin for compressor and turbine rotor is also 
required to be substantiated as adequate to withstand operation for 
five minutes a.t a turbine inlet or exhaust gas temperature of 75°F more 
than the maximum rated turbine inlet or exhaust gas te:nperature while 
not less than the maximum rated speed. Acceptable methods for sub-
stantiating the overstress margin of turbine and compressor rotors 
are: 
A3-l0 
, 
t 
I 
" 
' : J 
NAPI'C-A ED-190l 
a. Testing a full ~cale rotor at speed and temperature in a 
complete unit. 
b. Testing a full scale rotor at speed and temperature in a 
spin pit. 
c. Testing a modified rotor in a complete unit at, a speed 
and temperature which will induce stresses equal to or greater than 
those required. 
d. Calculation of the overstress margin of the rotor at 
speed and temperature from basic data obtained by cold spinning." 
26. The general military specification, MIL-P-8686 (ASG) , reference 
(e), approved by the Department of the Air Force and by the Navy, covers 
the general requirements for gfl:l turbine type aircI'aft auxiliary power 
units. Rotor integrity substantiation is attempted by having the APU 
manufacturer perform material quality inspections. Paragraphs 4.3.1, 
4.3.2, 4.3.3, an(~ 4·.3.5 of reference (e) (listed below) describe the 
required tests and test methods: 
"4.3.1 Material tests.- Srunpl(;s of all materials used in the 
APU and components shall be selected in the manner and quantity specified 
in the material specification, and subjected to the requil'ed tests. 
4.3.2 ~~gnetic inspection.- The following parts shall be 
subject to magnetic particle inspection in accordance with Specification 
MIL-I-6868 or AMS2640 if made of magnetic materials: 
(a) All magnetic parts constituting the compressor-
turbine rotor assembly, including threaded fastenings. 
(b) Other highly stressed magnetic parts. 
(c) All accessory drive and vibration or friction 
dampener springs. 
4.3.3 Fluorescent penetrant inspection.- The following 
nonmagnetic r~ts shall be subject to fluorescent penetrant inspection 
in accordance with Specification MIL-I-6866 or AMS2645: 
(a) Turbine disk. 
(b) Turbine blades. 
(c) Turbine nozzle vanes and assemblies. 
(d) All other hi~ stressed parts. 
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4.3.5 Radiographic or ultrasonic inspection.- The following 
parts shall be subject to radiographic or ultrasonic inspection for 
defects or soundness to a degree of inspection on each article as 
agreed between the contractor and the procuring activity: 
(a) The compressor impeller or rotor(s), if it is 
nonmagnetic. 
(b) The turbine rotor(s), if it is nonmagnetic. 
(c) Highly stressed magnesium and aluminum castings. " 
27. When performing the fluorescent penetrant inspection, some 
manufacturers apply the penetrant to the rotor while it is being rotated 
~t milit~ speed in a spin chamber. Supposedly, if there is a small 
crack, the dye will have a better chance to penetrate while in the 
stressed condition. 
28. Reference (f) is a model specification covering the require-
ments of a particular gas turbine power unit used by the Navy. Para-
graph 3.36.2 of reference (f) states that: Design integrity of 
high-energy rotors shall be provided to the extent that each rotor 
shall be capable of withstanding the stabilized speed required to 
produce 1.50 times the kinetic energy of the rotor as determined at 
the maximum speed that the unit would experience under transient 
conditions and which is limited by the unit's safety devices and at 
maximum operating temperature. The integrity test reqv.ires that each 
turbine, exducer, and compressor rotor be subjected to an overspeed 
whirlpit spin test conducted at the conditions required to produce the 
kir.~tic energy specified in paragraph 3.36.2 as a means of checking 
for material flaws that are undetectable by other established inspection 
procedures. All tests shall be conducted at speeds which have been 
corrected to compensate for maximum operating temperature." 
c. Starters 
29. Recent philosophies regarding aircraft engine starter rotor 
integrity substantiation can be gathered by reviewing certain portions 
of the general aircraft engine starter exhibit (reference (g)) proposed 
by the USAF. This exhibit establishes the general requirements for jet 
fuel starters (designed to operate on jet fuel as a self-contained unit) 
for aeronautical gas turbine engines. 
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30. Paragraph 3.9.1 of reference (g) states: "The starter shall 
be designed and developed to achieve the highest operational reliability 
commensurate \-lith the cdsign rec', irements. The starter covered by thi~ 
specification shall have a minirm.Ull "" eliabili t.y of 0.99 for a 1 cycle mis-
sion at a confidence factor of 90 p€;rce:l1t. Satisfactory completion of 
a~l tests set forth under paragraph 4 of this specification will demon-
strate compliance with the quantitative reliability requirements of this 
specification." An explanation of confidence factor is included in 
reference (h). 
31. Prior to conducting any operational starter tests, paragraph 
4.4.3.9 of reference (g) requires that the following be accomplished 
on all high speed components: 
"a. Subject each part to X-Ray inspection in accordance with 
MIL-STD-453. Any cracks or occlusions that will adversely affect starter 
performance or life shall be cause for rejection. 
"b. Subject each part to fluorescent penetrant inspection in 
accordance with MIL-I-6866. Any cracks or occlusions that will adversely 
affect starter performance or life shall be cause for rejection. 
II c. Proof spin each turbine wheel for one minute at room 
temperature at the proof speed." (Proof speed is less than t~le minimum 
yield speed and greater than the maximum free running speed • Its exact 
value is specified in the model specification.) 
"d. Upon completion of a, b, and c above, subject each turbine 
wheel to X ... Ray inspection to determine the extent of deformity, struc-
tural dam,age ,and growth of cracks or occlusions. Any deformity, 
structural damage, growth of cracks or occlusions, or any new cracks 
shall be cause for rejection." 
32. Establishment of a minimum overhaul life for the starter is 
verified when the unit performs as required by paragraph 3.7.18 of 
reference (g): '~he unit shall perform in accordance with the require-
ments of this specification throughout (1) 3000 hours of overrunning 
(normal aircraft operating time) and 2000 start cycles or (2) 3000 
hours of overrunning, 1200 start cycles, and ten hours of motoring 
time. The duration of the motoring cycles shall be from two to ten 
minutes. II 
33. To provide overspeed protection, the starter must be able to 
contain all starter fragments and, "incorporate a speed limiting feature 
which will safely limit the starter speed, either loaded or unloaded. 
The speed limiting feature(s) shal: limit rotation of all high speed 
components to 75 percent of the minimmn burst speed(s). The limiting 
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feature shall not require manual resetting and shall function, as neces-
sary, throughout the overhaul life of the starter without maintenance 
or adjustment. In addition, the speed limiting feature shall be totally 
contained within the starter and shall not require external power of any 
kind. The speed limiting feature(s) shall be described in detail in the 
model specification. Demonstration of the speed limiting feature(s) during 
the mos·t severe operating condition shall be required. Operation of the 
speed limiting feature(s) shall not result in damage to the starter." 
34. MIL-S-38399 (USAF) (reference (i» is a specification that 
covers the general requirements for pneumatic starters for aeronautical 
gas turbine engines. Its content concerning rotor integrity is basically 
the same as stated in reference (g). 
C. CONT AINMENT CRITERIA 
a. General 
35. Basically it can be said that fragment containment is required 
when experience has dictated that a satisfactory level of passenger and 
equipment protection can not be attained despite all efforts directed 
toward good design and quality control. The degree of protection de-
pends largely on the type of equipment, its location, its use, and the 
economic and weight penalty associated with the protective system 
available. 
36. The following section of this appendix reviews same of the 
specifications dealing with commercial and military containment re-
quirements for engines, auxiliary power units, and starters. 
b. Engines 
37. For a commercial aircraft engine to be certificated by the 
FAA it must comply with Part 33 of reference (a). The durability of 
the engine casings is specifically mentioned in paragraph 33.19: 
"Engine design and construction must minimize the developnent of an 
unsafe condition of the engine between overhaul periods. The design 
of the compressor and turbine rotor cases must provide for the con-
tainment of damage from rotor blade failure." Note that there is no 
mention of containment of disk fragments and there is no differentiation 
made between the compressor section and the fan section. 
38. A large portion of Ad.vicory Circular 33-lA (reference (k» 
provides guidance and acceptable means, not the sole means, by which 
compliance may be shown with the design and construction requirements 
of Part 33 of the FAR dealing with rotor blade co~tainment. 
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39. The FAA considers that a compressor and/or turbine rotor blade 
failure is likely to be encountered only as a single occurrence affecting 
just one engine of any multiengine aircraft in anyone flight. 
40. "The most critical single blade(s), usually of the largest size, 
with failure assumed in the retention member or in adjacent base sections 
is considered more likely to fail in service. While the majority of 
failures are expected to occur in the blade airfoil section, failures 
in or near the retention sections of the blade are also anticipated and 
are more difficult to contain in the engine. For integrally bladed rotors, 
failure of a significant portion of a blade should be assumed." 
41. In complying with the regulations relative to demonstrating 
containment of damage from broken rotor blades, it is acceptable to 
conduct tests of the nature indicated in paragraph 10 of reference (k) 
(below) to meet the sUbstantiation criteria in paragraph 11 (reference 
(k». '~n lieu of planned official tests, pertinent related development 
experience, service experience, and analyses are usually acceptable means 
of compliance for engine substantiation. Any special operating precautions 
or techniques determined from these tests, which will aid in quickly re-
storing engine power for preventing further adverse effects to the engine 
after ingestion typical of those expected to occur in service, are suggested 
to be incorporated in the engine manual. 
42. "When demonstrating blade containment, substantiation should cover 
the effects on containment with rotor cases at the max~um temperatures 
reached in service. The objective is to demonstrate both single blade 
containment and that the possibility of secondary internal failures 
penetrating the engine cases is minimized. Lack of containment has 
occurred from the secondary balling-up action of internal engine debris. 
It is desired that demonstration of blade containment be accomplished 
with a complete engine but, when component testing is chosen, complete 
compressor and turbine rotor section assemblies should be used." 
43. The rotor blade sUbstantiation test of reference (k) states: 
"Rotor blades are to be evaluated for both ingestion effects and con-
tainment, and should be released from a rotor at maximum operating 
r.p.m. The rotor blades evaluated normally include all those which in 
combination with the adjacent rotor case wall section are likely to be 
the most difficult to contain. A representative delay in initiating 
engine shutdown is recommended after the first indication of a fault 
from engine instruments, following blade ingestion, to simulate crew 
reaction time." 
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44. Relative to rotor blade containment, "the engine is acceptable 
if, during the ingestion tests, the damage from rotor blade failures is 
contained by the engine, e.g., without causing (1) extreme hazards, and 
(2) significant case rupture or hazardous distortion of the engine casing 
and the expulsion of blades through a~d beyond the engine case in a manner 
which could cause hazard to the aircraft. " 
45. The military engine specification (reference (d)) makes only a 
brief statement relative to rotor blade containment. Paragraph 3.16.3.1 
states: "The design of the compressor and turbine cases shall provide 
containment of damage from rotor blade fe.l1ures." 
46. It is of interest to note the following concerning the FAA and 
military requirements for rotor blade containment: 
a. Only blade fragments are required to be contained. No men-
tion is made of disk (any size fragment) containment. 
b. There is no specific criteria available to judge what stage 
of rotor-casing constitutes the most difficult containment problem. The 
RBPP is not aware of data indicating the fragment mass or fragment trans-
lational kinetic energy is the most critical containment parameter, and 
engine experience with similar previous models does not help the newly 
designed engines of differing physical characteristics. 
c. The large fan blades are considered in the same category 
as all other compressor and/or turbine blades. It has been suggested 
that these large fan blades be exempt from the blade containment regula-
tions and be considered as propellers which would mean these blades would 
be subjected to paragraph 33.35, "Centrifugal load test" and paragraph 
35.37, "Vibration test" of reference (a). A discussion of this situation 
is considered not in the scope of this immediate discussion. 
d. The deflection of blade fragments, i.e., the control of 
their trajectories away from sensitive aircraft areas, is not mentioned. 
47. Paragraph 25.361 - Engine torque (reference (a)) requires that 
each engine mount and its supporting structures must be designed for 
engine torque effects and for turbine engine installations, lithe limit 
engine torque load imposed by sudd~n engine stoppage due to malfunction 
or structural failure (such as compre~sor jamming) must be considered 
in the design of the engine mounts and supporting structure. " 
4S. This particular paragraph is mentioned here since there were 
same questions as to whether a major rotor failure would be of such 
magnitude to rip an engine from its mount. Engine manufacturers have 
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replied that the requirements of the above paragraph are more severe than 
those predicted as a result of an uncontained rotor failure and so they 
do not consider the possibility of an uncontained rotor failure causing 
an engine to be wrenched from its mount. 
c. Auxiliary Power Units 
49. TSO-C77 {reference (e)) divides APU's into two categories: 
"Category I: Essential Power. Power which is used to 
drive accessories necessary for maintaining 
safe operation of the aircraft either on the 
groUL~d or in flight. 
"Category II: Nonessential Power. Power which may be dis-
continued without jeopardizing safe operation 
of the aircraft either on the ground or in 
flight." 
The containment requirements of TSO-C77 vary according to the categorJ 
of the APU. 
50. All units are required (paragraph 5.13) to have their compressor 
and turbine rotor cases designed to provide for containment of damage 
from rotor blade failures. For rotors incorporating more than one stage, 
containment need be demonstrated for the critical stage only. The manu-
facturer is required to substantiate which stage is the critical one (in 
paragraph 3.23 a critical stage is designated as the stage whose casing 
is most susceptible to penetration). Again it should be noted, as it 
was during the discussion of blade protection for engines, what a large 
problem is the determination of the most dangerous section of casing. 
51. The compressor and turbine rotor cases of nonessential units 
shall be designed to contain max~~ energy failod rotor fragments unless 
compliance with certain rotor integrity substantiations are established. 
(A maximum energy rotor is a rotating component or assembly which, if it 
ruptures, will generate particles with sufficient energy as to cause 
secondary damage to the rotor housing.) Essential units are required 
to show compliance with all rotor integrity and service life criteria 
and are not required to demonstrate rotor burst containment. 
52. Rotor and rotor blade containment is to be demonstrated under 
the conditions in the following paragraphs: 
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"7.3.1 Speed. Containment shall be demonstrated at the maximum 
obtainable speed defined by subparagraphs a and b. 
"a. If safety devices (to prevent ha.zardous overspeed 
or overtemperature conditions) arEI l.ncorporated, a apeed equal to the 
highest speed which would result from failure of anyone of the normal 
engine control systems. 
"b. If no safety devices are incorporated, a speed 
eC!ual t( -;~e hjgtest speed which would result from the failure of any 
m'I~~ of thd 11r,}'mal ~'ngine control systems. 
"7.3.2~e~pera.ture. Containment shall be demonstrated with 
the~ontailling components at the temperature prevalent during operation 
.:=.t mn.ximum rated power. 'I 
53. The military (Air Force and Navy) general specification for 
gas turbine type aircraft auxiliary power units is MIL-P -8686 (ASG) 
(reference (f)). This specification categorizes APUls into four type 
~~)'tlPS de)endent upon their primary use. Paragraph 3.5.15 (reference 
(f)) spocifies that the design of the APU shall be such that failure 
of a major section will not result in damage to either of the other 
sections. Hore detailed requirements al"e spelled out in the model 
specifications. An example of this can be shown with reference (g) 
which covers the requirements of a Service Type IV APU. Paragraphs 
3.36.1 and 3.36.1.1 relate to rotor blade and turbine rotor hub con-
tainment respectively. 
"3.36.1 Rotor Blade Containment. For the event of rotor blade 
failure, full containment of the failed rotor blade(s) most likely to 
occur shall be provided. 
3.36.1.1 Turbine Rotor Hub Containment. For the event of the 
rotor hub failure, full containment of a maximum-energy turbine rotor 
segment shall be provided. Containment is to be shown at any combina-
tion of speeds up to the maximum speed (speed that would result from the 
most adverse, single control-system failure) and at any temperature up 
to the maximum operating turbine temperature." 
54. In this specification a maximum energy rotor segment is considered 
to be a fragment from a three-piece (tri-hub) burst, i.e., each fragment 
has an included angle of 120°. Actually, as it was shown in reference 
(e), a flat rotor fragment having an included angle of 133.56° possesses 
the maximum translational kinetic energy per fragment, not maximum total 
fragment energy per fragment. The usage of "maximum energy burst" as 
equivalent to a tri-hub burst has unfortunately found same acceptance 
with containment people. The RBPP has found no proof that a tri-hub 
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burst produces the most critically-shaped, potentially dangerous fragments. 
Future RBPP efforts will be directed toward the determination of what is 
the most critical fragment for each type of control system. It is interest-
ing to note that a tri-hub burst does promote a "uniform" impacting condi-
tion in a containment ring which may be easier to control than a "single" 
impact caused by the release of just one fragment. The RBPP strongly 
suggests that a tri-hub burst not be classified as a "maximum energy burst". 
55. }1ilitar,y specification MIL-E-38453 (USAF) (reference (m)) outlines 
the performance, design, data submittal, and testing requirements for 
envirormental control,envi~onmental protection and engine bleed air sub-
systems. 
56. Equipment that performs the following functions is included in 
specification: 
"a. Pressurization, cooling, heating, ventilation, contamination 
control and moisture control in personnel and equipment compartments. 
"b. Pressurization of inflata.ble pressure seals, fuel tanks and 
miscellaneous equipment. 
"c. Air supply for air-driven power conversion devices and boundary 
layer control. 
"d. Removal of rain, snow, insects, salt, frost, fog and ice 
from transparent surfaces. 
"e. Anti-icing or deicing of flight surfaces, radomes, antenna, 
and ram air scoops. 
"f. Pressurization and temperature control of elect.ronic equipnent, 
anti-G suits, pressure suits and ventilation gar.ments. 
"g. Distribution of engine compressor bleed air between the engines 
and those components and subsystems which require bleed air." 
57. Paragraph 3.2.1.11 presents the containment criteria that these 
units must meet: nThe housing and scrolls of all rotating machinery shall 
completely contain the fragments from rotating blades and wheel bursts 
(tri-hub failure) at the maximum speed that can result from ~.ny failure 
inducing condition or 135 percent of the maximum normal spoed, whichever 
is greater at the pressure and temperature associated _ith these speeds. 
Containment is meant to mean that fragments may penetrate the containing 
housing but shall not pass through the housing. Particles or parts 
resulting from a failure ~nd passing through inlet or outlet ports of 
the assembly shall be contained by the adjoining ducting." 
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58. To show compliance with this requirement individual rotors are 
usually modified to fail in three equally sized fragments at the pre-
determined maximum speed and temperature. Note here again the acceptance 
of the tri-hub failure as the most severe test. 
59. As previously mentioned in this appendix, not all APU's of 
importance are airborne, although many such gas tL~bine engines used 
by the Army are 1-re:ight sensitive since they must be capable of being 
air-dr.opped into areas of operation. Reference (n) is a U. S. Army 
purchase description that covers "design, construction, and performance 
requirements for a gas turbine engine suitable for directly driving 
high speed equipment, primarily electric generators, uithout the use 
of pOvler output speed reduction gears, and also suitable for incorporating 
pm-rer output speed reduction gears for lower speed requirements. The 
engine is to be sized for operating most economically at three power 
ratings, and is to be designed to operate both as a simple cycle engine 
or to incorporate a heat exchanger, while using identical or modified 
components, in lieu of completely neH and different components, to the 
maximum degree." 
60. This description requires that "the turbine assembly shall 
ut1.lize a single radial turbine wheel, a radial axial '-rheel combination, 
or multiple axial "Theels Hi th appropriate nozzle rings and shrouding. 
The required machining and balancing, and the use of cast construction 
shall be considered for minimum production cost .fl This suggestion that 
cast rotors be used is becoming more prevalent throughout the industry. 
It is noteworthy since the RBPP expects that the interactions between 
the rotor fragments and fragment control system ,·rill be very much different 
than those observed '\-lith conventionally forged disks and fastened blades • 
61. Paragraph 3.7.3.1 requires that "the turbine assembly shall be 
des': gned for l.'heel containment sufficient to withstand a uheel burst at 
any speed up to 110 percent of normal rated speed. If a radial turbine 
wheel is used, the containment shall withstand a maximum energy burst 
of the entire wheel. If multiple axial wheels are used, the containment 
shall withstand the simultaneous burst of all rot-f'r blades plus a maximum 
energy burst of any one turbine disc. The capab~lity of the turbine 
assembly to provide sufficient wheel containment shall be demonstrated 
by equipping the test engine with a turbine section containing a turbine 
wheel which has been prenotched to fail with resulting maximum energy 
burst at a speed 110 percent of normal rated speed. The engj~e shall be 
operated to demonstrate containment of the notched ,",heel with failure 
occurring at the 110 percent speed point. For engines containing multiple 
turbine stages the wheel selection for wheel c~ntainment demonstration 
shall be mutually selected by the contractor and the Government." 
A3-20 
I 
NAPTC-AED-1901 
62. Here again we see two things: (1) the assumption that a tri-
hub burst is the most severe type of rotor failure (ascertained from 
discussions with ERDL personnel), and (2) the most sensitive (relative 
to containment) stage must be determined by the contractor and the 
Government without any specific guidelines being established in the 
specification. 
d. Starters 
63. Many specificatior;.s have been written covering the requirements 
for starters for aeronautical gas turbine engines. Pneumatic, cartridge, 
and jet fuel type starters have all been considered. Rather than discuss 
all the individual specifications, we have selected some that we believe 
reflect the most recent thinking relative to containment criteria. 
a. HIL-S-27266 (USAF) (reference (0») is a general specificatlon 
for cartridge and pneumatic starters. The overspeed failure test requires 
that "upon satisfactory completion of cycling and endurance testing, the 
starter shall be subjected to an overspeed condition, using a cartridge 
conditioned to 160°F, such that a structural failure will occur within 
the starter. In the event the starter incorporates a containment feature, 
failure of the starter to remain on its mount or the housing to contain 
fragments upon structural failure of internal parts shall be cause for 
rejection." Note that the rotors are not modified to induce any specific 
type of failure. 
b. MIL-S-19557B (WEP) (reference (p» is a model specification 
for an air turbine starter. The starter suall provide containment of 
all rotating components and the starter housing shall remain on the 
mounting pad of the engine acceasory drive. Paragraph 4.5.15.1 concerns 
the hub containment test. It states that after the starter has completed 
the endurance testing, Pit shall be reassembled with the turbine whe(l 
slotted to induce a three equal segment hub burst at a speed not less 
than the maximum cutout speed. All rotating components shall be contained 
within the starter housing and the starter housing shall remain attached 
to the mounting pad of the engine accessory drive." Paragraph 4.5.15.2 
states the no-load failure requirements as: "the starter shall be operated 
from rest at no-load with the cutout speed switch inoperative at an inlet 
air pressure and temperature of 110 psia and 680°F until failure occurs 
and rotation ceases. All rotating components shall be contained within 
the starter housing and the starter shall I'emain attached to the mounting 
pad of the engine accessory drive." 
64. The starter covered by exhibit SEJIA-67-l (reference (q» was 
designed to operate on jet fuel as a self-contained unit. This unit is 
basically divided into three modules; gas generator, acoessory, and 
power turbine. The starter was to be designed to incorporate the 
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following feature: "The starter ahall provide complete containment of 
all starter fragments (including three section hub burst) and remain 
on its mount should a failure occur under any operating condition 
(temperature and altitude) from sea level to 8,000 feet. In addition, 
the starter shall contain any failure that occurs due to uncontrolled 
acceleration of the gas generator or ener~ conversion and speed re-
duction assembly including failure of the disengaging clutch." 
65. "Demonstrations which result in fire external of the starter, 
external surface temperatures in excess of 700oF, or failure of the 
starter to contain all fragments and remain on its mounting, shall 
be cause for rejection. Parts may fall from the starters exhaust duct 
provided they contain no destructive energy. This shall be demonstrated 
by placing a sheet of soft aluminum (.032 or thinner) within three feet 
of the starter's exhaust duct such that the exhaust gases will impinge 
on the aluminum. The aluminum sheet shall be supported such that it 
will not have a solid backing within one inch of the under side. Any 
pronounced dent or puncture of the aluminum shall also be cause for 
rejection. After each containment demonstration, the starter shall be 
disassembled and inspected for damage resulting from the test. Photo-
graphs shall be taken of the starter before disassembly shO'Wing any 
exter!or da.n;.age and during disassembly shwing all internal damage." 
66. Other containment demonstrations required are: 
"a. After comple~ion of the teardolffl inspection, the starter 
shall be reassembled and subjected to two normal starter cycles to as-
sure correct assembly and operation. The starter shall then be subjected 
to uncontrolled overspeed conditions which will demonstrate the normal 
modes of failure of both the gas generator and the energy conversion 
and speed reductioI.L assflmbly. Each demonstration shall be conducted 
as follows: 
U(l) The energy conversion and speed reduction assembly 
shall be subjected to an uncontrolled overspeed condition by operating 
the starter in a no-load condition with all cutout devices in the energy 
conversion and speed reduction assembly rendered inoperative. 
"(2) The starter shall be refurbished as required to pro-
vide normal operation of the complete unit. Developnent hardware may 
be used as required to refurbish the portion of the starter damaged 
during the test required in (1) above. Two normal cycles of operation 
shall then be conducted to assure correct assembly and operation. The 
gas generator shall then be caused to fail due to an uncontrolled over-
speed condition by rbndering all fuel controls inoperat~ve to permit 
maximum fuel flow. 
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"b. After completion of th~ teardown inspection, the energy 
conversion and speed reduction assewbly turbinp wheel will be weakened 
such that a hub failure will occur near the upper limit of the cutout 
speed range. The cutout switch shall be deactivated or reset to a speed 
above the specified upper limit. The starter shall then be reassembled 
and subjected to a normal start cycle to demonstrate turbine wheel hub 
containment capability. After demonstration of the energy conversion 
and speed reduction assembly tt~bine wheel hub containment. and inspection 
of the resulting dEmage, the starter shall be refurbished ~nd subjected 
to two normal start cycles to assure correct assembly and operation. 
Other test or development hardware may be used to replace the damaged 
parts. The gas generator shall t.hen be disassembled and the compressor 
wheel shall be weakened such that a hub failure will occur near the 
upper limit of the speed range t)ssociated with operation of a 60 to 
1000F day, whichever is greater. The strrter shall then be reassembled 
and subjected to a start cycle that will cause compressor wheel hub 
failure. Either or both of the, above demonstrations may be conducted 
on sample number one if the stf;~·rter can be refurbished to operate 
normally after the containment demonstrations required in "a" above. 
"c. After completion of the teardown inspection, the gas 
generator turbine wheel shall be weakened such that a hub failure will 
occur near the upper limit of the speed range associated with oper~tion 
on a 60 tu 100!jF day, whichever is greater. The starter shall thttn be 
reassembled an,1 subj ected to a start cycle that will cause turbir:a 
wheel hub failure. 
67. "Addi ',ional containment demonstrations may be required depending 
upon the particular starter design or inconclusive demonstrations result-
ing from 1.:,he 'tests required in "a", "b", and "c" above. Additional tests 
m~ be directed at time of starter design evaluation or at any time prior 
to preproduction approval." 
68. tA.cmbers of the SAE Committee AE-6, Starting Systems, are working 
on a proposed general specification for pneumatic starters for aircraft 
engines (proposed AS 943) (reference (r)). Paragraph 3.7.1 of t.his 
reference relates to unit overspeed protection. It states: "Except 
for partIcles emittE.ld from the exhaust, the starter shall be capable 
of containment of all starter fragments within its envelope and remain 
on its mount should a free-run failure occur with air at the worst com-
bination of pressure and temperature possible in the s)'''5tem from sea 
level to the maximum aircraft operation'll al t i tude. 'I'he starter shall 
be designed to provid~ containment of maximum energy hub burst (3-piece 
1200 segm€nts) ot the turbine wheel at a speed not less than the maximum 
cutout speed or the maximum free running speed as specified in the 
detail specification. Conts,inment demonstration of all high speed 
rotating components shall be required. The containment features shall 
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be described in detail in the model specification and 1t shall be demon-
strated that any fragments emi~ted from the starter ey~aust shall not 
constitute a fire hazard or have sufficient energy to !farm equirment 
or personnel." 
69. The last portion of this section is noteworthy since there is 
some cor..cern that titanium rotors interacting uith steel or titanium 
shroud may produce hot fra~lents that could constitute a fire hazard. 
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